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THE PART II, PROOF OF CONCEPT, PHASE HAS BEEN SUCCESSFULLY
COMPLETED.
ENCLOSED IN THIS REPORT ARE THE FOLLOWING ATTACt-LMENTS
1) GU-LDELINES AND ASSL_'k, IPTIONS
2) S L.'5.,gvLA_RY/C ONCL USIONS
3) FF-DAREL WORKSFIEETS WITH SUPPORTING ENCLOSURES
GDS SCHEMATIC
FLI"qCTIONAL BLOCK DIAGtL,-kM
I,
- GDS MECHANICAL/ELECTRIC,ZL FF
- BLOCK FUNCTIONS TABLE
- FUNCTIONAL FAILURES TABLE
- ACTIVE COMPONENTS IN FL._CTIONA.L BLOCKS
4) XLM-NTA.INABILITY AND RELIABILITY CONSIDEtLkTIONS IN HEALTH
MANAGEMENT
l° GU IDELLN ES/ASSUMPTIONS
* Evaluate/,_uaalyze only the Gas Distribution Subsystem (GDS)
* Focus I-_l activities on the FF-DAREL Process
* Use the PDR Configuration (per COTR instruction)
(.All are aware that this configuration has change considerably since PDR)
* Deve!op I-LM Requirements from all available data on all subsystems (This is more
mature information than would normally be available for use in defining requirements)
Make assumptions, as necessary.' to complete this effort
* lfa "Component" fails in our analysis, we do not concern ourselves as to how it fails,
except to the extent of all the "Resulting Effects"
2. SUM,MARY/CONCLUSIONS
The Gas Distribution Subsystem was studied and evaluated utilizing the PDR
Configuration and with respect to the design features encompassing Health Management (I-_I)
aspects outlined in the Generic Handbook (specifically the FF-DAREL Process) This I-tiM effort
addresses equipment and failures at a higher level than FMEA efforts and results in less
worksheets, and focuses results toward "Test" and "Operations" issues
We were only able to conduct limited discussions with the skilled designers who are
extremely knowledgeabI_ of the GDS. This limitation has probably resulted in somewhat shallo_ '
analysis, but, the major subjects have been addressed and evaluated
The GDS is largely a self contained subsystem, and is largely simplex, but some
redundancy is included in the design and its functions have been identified and its use in [-LM have
been analyzed The lack of needed, or possibly desired, redundancy is also identified and its
impact is assessed A significant lack of"two fault tolerant Functional Failure" cases (component
and paths) are identified and a recommendation for simple inclusion of redundancy is being
discussed with the Detail Designer The details of the approach could be pursued, if desired, by
the Detail Design Engineer A significant amount of manual operations to perform "Corrective
Action" has been identified (even operational procedures) This condition often precludes
utilizing software to isolate and recover from Functional Failures
The software is not yet mature and detail was not available to us to insure whether or not
Paragraph 312631 in the S/W Requirement Specification, Level III (The SA,V shall be capable
of detecting, isolating, and responding to faults within the GDS) is being met Our conclusion is
that the PDR GDS configuration will not allow this requirement to be accommodated in many
instances I identified in the FF-DAREL Worksheets). Accommodating this requirement is a
significant effort, but is vital to our HM Concept and would be documented in the ISIRL for each
Functional Failure and for use in Test and Operations Note The S/W requirement is also stated
in the "Core System Requirement Document", Para 337
The results of this study have shown a definite need for coordinating need for
measurements _ithin, and between, subsystems to accommodate insuring that Functional Failures
are properly revealed and can be substantiated as valid by other measurements, even from other
interfacin,, subsystems
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Wewerenot ableto performa majorgoalof our Conceptinvolving"Developingan
additionalevelof InformationbydefiningIntersystemInformationalRelationships" Thiswas
becausetheExperimentModule(EM) andICE aretheonlyelectricalinterfacesto theGDS The
EM (specifically, the Crystal Growlh Module) has just within the past few days identified a
significant number of measurements for that system. This will allow some additional HM
considerations and evaluations, but time was not available to perform this task. The ICE Interface
is more mature, but was not addressed because of guidelines and time constraints on this effort
These efforts can be readily accomplished with additional time to perform the assessments
- We have concluded that the HM aspects in our Concept could nave been significantly
enhanced in the GDS design had the Concept been in place at the start of the Initial Design Phase
of the Project However, we feel that this Part II, Proof of Concept Phase, has been very
successful and has accomplished its purpose and indicates very useful types of information which
can be gleaned and evaluated from the current design and useful to the Project and Project
Manager in upcoming Reviews and throughout the SSFF Development/Operational Phase
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Figure '2. GDS Pneumatic Schematic
3. FF-WORKSHEETS WITH SUPPORTING ENCLOSURES
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BLOCK FUNCTIONS TABLE
GAS SUPPLY MODULE
a Supplies inert gas to Core Rack gas control module when manual valve is open
b Provides safety over pressure device (BD1)
c Provides manual pressure readout at all times
CORE RACK GAS CONTROL MODULE
a Provides control (manual valve) and filtering of GN2 from SSLNS to TECS
b Provides filtering pressure regulation and control (SV) oFLN2 ro IR (Left & Right) gas
supply assemblies
c Provides filtering, pressure regulaton and control (SV) of(AR) to _ (Left & Rightl gas
supply assemblies
d Provide over pressure safety devices (BD2,BD3)
GAS SUPPLY ASSEMBLY (2 EACH, 1 OF WHICH HAS 2 SEPAI:L_TE,DUAL
FUNCTIONS)
a. Provides source gas (AR or LN2) selection
b Provides (Selected) gas control (SV) to EM
c Provide blocking ofEM gasses which might travel backward to GDS (CV)
PRESSURE CONTROL ASSEMBLY (3 EACH, 1 FOR EACH EM)
a Provides control (SV) ofEM gasses to accumulator (for use when SS Vacuum Exhaust
System is not available)
VACUUM VENT ASSEMBLY (2 EACH, 1 OF WHICH SERVES 2 EM'S)
a Provides particle filtering
b Provides pressure relief(RV) [2 relief(redundant) valves for each E.M]
-- To Vacuum Exhaust System
c Provides Control (2 series SV & MV & DCV)of exhaust gasses to VES
d Provides Control (SV &MV) drainage of accumulator to VES
e Provides Selection of VRS or VES to downstream (outlet side) of EM
FUNCTIONAL FAILURES
GAS SUPPLY MODULE
a Fails to supply inert gas to core rack gas control
b Fails to stop supplying inert gas to core rack
c. Failure to provide over pressure relief
d Manual pressure gage fails to provide readout
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CORE RACK GAS CONTROL MODULE
a Fails to provide control and filtered LN2 to TECS
b LN2 to [R (Left and/or Raght) gas supply assemblies
Fails to filter
Fails to provide proper re malation
Fails to supply
,-MR.to IR (Left and/or Right) gas supply assemblies
Fails to filter
Fails to provide proper retaliation
Fails to supply
d Fails to provide over pressure relief
C
GAS SUPPLY ASSEMBLY
a DCV 1, 3 or 5 fails to allow selection of source gas
b SV3.7 OR 1l fails to control (On/Off) gas flow to EM
c CVI. 2 OR 3 fails to block EM gasses backflow into GDS
4 PRESSURE CONTROL ASSEM]3LY
Fails to vent EM ,_,asses to accumulator when commanded
"; V.-\('LUM VENT ASSEMBLY
a Fails to provide particle filtering
b Fails to provide EM pressure relief to VES (Redundant)
Fails to provide EM pressure relief to VES {Redundant)
c SV4. S. 12 fails to vent EM exhaust gasses to VES when commanded
d S\'O. 10. 14 and XIV4. 5 & 6 fails to provide drainage of accumulator to VES _shen
commanded
\'_e DC .. 4, e, fails to select VRS or VES to do,an stream EM when commanded
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ACTIVE COMPONENTS IN FUNCTIONAL BLOCKS
GAS SUPPLY MODULE
- Pressure Vessel
- Pressure Gauge
- Safety Device
- Manual Valve
- Quick Disconnect
PVI
PGI
BD1
MV1
QDI
II CORE tL4.CK GAS CONTROL MODL_LE
For LN2
- Quick Disconnect
- Manual Valve
- Filter (01Mic)
- Manual Valve
- Pressure Regulator (1 Stage)
- Pressure Transducer
- Solenoid Valve
- Burst Disc
- Vent Filter
- Quick Disconnect
- Quick Disconnect
QD4
M'V2
F2
MV3
PR2
PT3
SV2
BD3
VF2
QD5
QD6
For Inert (.M1.) Gas
- Filter ( 01 Mic)
- Pressure Transducer
- Pressure Regulater
- Pressure Transducer
- Solenoid Valve
- Burst Disc
- Vent Filter
- Quick Disconnect
- Quick Disconnect
F1
PTI
PRI
PT2
SVI
BD2
VF1
QD2
QD3
III GAS SUPPLY ASSEMBLY (RIGHT IR)
- Quick Disconnect (AR)
- Quick Disconnect (LN2)
- Directional Control Valve
- Solenoid Valve
- Check Valve
- Experiment Module
QDll
QD12
DCV5
SVI 1
CV3
EM(R-IR)
IV PRESSURE CONTROL ASSEMBLY (RIGHT IR)
- Pressure Transducer
- Vacuum Sensor
- Solenoid Valve
- Pressure Transducer
- Accumulator
PT8
VS3
SVI3
PT9
ACC3
V VACU-L2M VENT ASSEMBLY (RIGHT IR)
- Relief Valve RV5
- Relief Valve RV6
- Filter (O1Mic) F5
- Solenoid Valve SV12
- Solenoid Valve SV 14
- Manual Valve MV6
- Directional Control Valve DCV6
- Quick Disconnect (VRS) QDI3
- Quick Disconnect (VES) QDI4
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VI GASSUPPLYASSEMBLY (LEFT IR)
- Quick Disconnect (AR)
- Quick Disconnect (GN2)
QD7
QD8
For EM- 1
- Directional Control Valve
- Solenoid Valve
- Check Valve
- Experiment Module
DCV1
SV3
CV1
EM-I •
For EM-2
- Directional Control Valve
- Solenoid Valve
- Check Valve
- Experiment Module
DCV3
SV7
CV2
EM-2
VII PRESSURE CONTROL ASSEMBLY (LEFT IR)
For EM- 1
- Pressure Transducer PT4
- Vacuum Sensor VS1
- Solenoid Valve SV5
- Pressure Transducer PT5
- Accumulator ACC 1
For EM-2
-Pressure Transducer PT6
- Vacuum Sensor VS2
- Solenoid Valve SV9
- Pressure Transducer PT7
- Accumulator ACC2
ll
VIII VACUL,_¢IVENT ASSEMBLY (LEFT IR)
- Quick Disconnect (VRS) QD9
- Quick Disconnect (VES) QD10
For EM- 1
- Relief Valve RV 1
- Relief \'alve RV2
- Filter _ 01Mic) F3
- Solenoid VaNe SV4
- Solenoid Valve SV6
- Manual Valve MV4
- Directional Control Valve DCV2
For EM-2
- Relief Valve RV3
- Relief Valve RV4
- Filter (01Mic) F4
- Solenoid Valve SV8
- Solenoid Valve SV 10
- Manual Valve MV5
- Directional Control Valve DCV4
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4. MAINTALNABILITY AND RELIABILITY CONSIDERATIONS
IN HEALTH MANAGEMENT
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The Space Station Furnace Facility (SSFF) is a modular facility which will provide the
platform for materials research in the microgravity environment. The facility is designed to
accommodate Experiment Modules (EM) which house an experiment The facility will provide
the function of interfacing the EM to ISSA services, conditioning and control for the experiment
module use, providing the controlled services to the experiment modules, and interfacing to and
acquiring data from the experiment modules
The SSFF has several subsystems which provide the above mentioned functions The
Subsystems are Electrical Power Subsystem (EPS), Command and Data Management Subsystem
(CDMS), Gas Distribution Subsystem (GDS), Thermal and Environmental Control Subsystem
(TECS), and the Instrumentation and Control Electronics (ICE). Subsystem
4.2 HEALTH MANAGEMENT INTRODUCTION
The facility is designed, constructed, tested to determine to be in an operable state, and lifted
into space Once in orbit, the SSFF is available to be placed on-line and to accept EM's in order
to perform experiments. The EMs are to be removed and replaced as required and remain in
operation for 2880 hours. This means that the SSFF is a mission oriented system Analysis will
determine whether the system is to be a repairable or non-repairable system
4.3 SYSTEM LEVEL HEALTH MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS
For the SSFF to accomplish its intended purpose, it must operate without failure for 2880
hours Since reality states that perfection is impossible, trade-offs must be made so that the
mission can be accomplished in a cost effective manner The intent is to minimize the cost and
successfully accomplish the intended mission. For example, say that the cost of an E.Xl plus the
cost or'lifting the EM into orbit is $600,000 O0 and each EM can be used oNv once TabJe I
sho_s an assumed relationship between Cost and P(MS) Assume that the allowable budge: is
52 4 million This means that the P(MS) must be 0 97 in order to meet budget in order to have _._
guaranteed successful mission. But, trade studies reveals that it is possible to build a system tha_
meets a P(MS) or reliability of 0.94; however, that it is very costly to build an SSFF that meets :_
reliability of 0 97 Thus engineering must perform some trade-offs in order that a successful
mission can be performed as well as to be within cost
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It is known that the SSFF is composed of five subsystems. A network model of the
subsystems is a series system This means that all of the subsystems must work for the system to
be a success If one subsystem fails, then the system fails Figure 1 shows the network model
Equation 1 is the mathematical expression that represents the network model
P(MS) cost to achieve
success (worst
case)
099 12
0 98 18
097 24
096 3 0
095 3 6
0.94 42
T.M3LE COST Vs P(MS)
P(MS) = P(EPS) * P(TECS) * P(CDMS) * P(ICE) * P(GDS) .................. (1)
Where P(MS) is the probability of mission success
P(EPS) is the probability that the EPS does not fail
P(TECS) is the probability that the TECS does not fail
P(CDMS) is the probability that the CDMS does not fail
P(ICE) is the probability that the ICE does not fail
P(GDS) is the probability that the GDS does not fail
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NEIWORK MODI 
far the
SSFF
Figure 1 Network Model of the SSFF
First some approximate values of the probability of mission success will be selected. From
Table 1, a value for P(MS) of 0.94 seems to be a practical selection for a beginning analysis
Since a P(MS) has been selected, the determination of test criteria can be investigated
P(MS) P(SS)
_ROBABILI_" OF _ROBABILI_" OF
MISSION SUCCESS) SUBSYSTEM SUCCESS)
0.99 0.99799
0.98 0.99596
0.97 099393
096 099187
095 0 98979
094 0 98770
Table 2, Trial P(MS)
Consider the SSFF as a single component system having a time-to-failure that is exponentially
distributed Evaluate analytically and by simulation the model using a P(MS) of 0 ?4 for a period
of 2880 hours Equation." is used to determine a trial failure rate for the SSFF
t"(J.IS) = exp(-2t) ...............
15
, (2)
094 = exp(-2* 2880)
2 = Ln (094)/2880
2 = 02148/10exp6fperhr ........................................... (3)
Equation 3 is the failure rate at which the SSFF must operate in order to provide the P(MS) of
094 This failure rate must be distributed over the five subsystems From Equation 1 O,
assuming that all subsystem failure rates are equal, the P(MS) equals to 0 9877
This means that the failure rate for each subsystem is,
2 = 4297/10 exp 6 fper hr .............................................. (4)
Hence, the next step is to perform some trade studies to determine the availability of component
parts with the required failure rates, cost, and lead time for the procurement of these parts From
experience, the availability of component that possess the required failure rates and meets cost
constraints is not cost effective Trade off's will have to be made
For this example, the GDS is selected When perusing the SSFF Maintainability .4malysis. a
component in GDS was found that had a high failure rate of 21 9 failures for eveR' million hours
When evaluating the P(MS) of the subsystem and entire SSFF, this high failure rate component
was found to be a series element in the network model. The P(MS) of this component is 0 e38 e_
This figure is lower than the system P(MS)
In Section 2 above, it was stated that the determination of the system type as to a repairable
or non-repairable svstem would be made From the results of the trade studies mentioned in the
previous paragraph, the system must be a repairable system in order to meet the P(.MS) of 0 _4
Bv using maintainability, the system P(MS) can be raised in a very cost effective manner It is
universally agreed that component parts with lower and lower failure rates are expensive and a
high man-hour requirement for maintenance is also very expensive Again a trade study is needed
to determine a cost effective balance Lets say that the trade study revealed that no science _ill
be lost if this high failure part can be replaced and the system returned to operation within 30
minutes This decision will accomplish two things, the P(MS) of the system will be increased and
the cost _ill be reduced Secondly, by managing the failure rate of the component, the
requirement for lo_, failure components is reduced
Let's investigate the test requirements for this maintenance action From Equation 5, the
relative uncertainty can be calculated From this analysis, test criteria will be selected It is given
that the avera,,e time to repair the part or MTTR is 30 minutes Assume a standard deviations of
l or 3 minutes How man,,' trial runs are needed to yield certainty of success Using Equation 5,
Table 2 was constructed The Table shows that as the number of trials increase the degree of
uncertainty decreases Also as the standard deviation decreases or narrows, the number of
16
requiredtrialsincreasesfor a desired level of certainty From Table ,_,"the selection of a certainty
is selected with a standard deviation of one The reason for the selection is for a fewer number of
trials the higher degree of certainty is achieved.
Ro. = s/x,/-£ ..................................................... (5)
Where R = Relative Uncertainty of the Trial Test
X
n
= Standard Deviation
= Average or Mean Value
Number of Trials Required
n S
1 3
4 3
2 5 3
3 6 3
1 1
X U nc C
30 01 090
30 005 095
30 002 0 98
30 0 016 0 983
30 0 033 0 97
4 1 30 0 017 0 98
25 1 30 0 007 0 99
36 1 30 0 006 0 99
Table 2, Relationship between Number of Test Trials Vs Degree of Certainty
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4.4 REQUIR MENTS
The I-LM requirements of the GDS can be stated.
The failure rate of the following systems shall be no greater than 4 297 failures in one
million hours
1 EPS
2 TECS
3 ICE
4 CDMS
The GDS shall have a mean time to repair (MTTR) of 30 minutes with a standard deviation of 3
minutes
Test requirements shall be that sufficient trials be conducted so that a 98% degree of certainty is
achieved The number of trials shall not be less than 25 The success criteria shall be that 98°0 of
the trials result in the replacement of the single component and the SSFF returned to service in
less than or equal 30 minutes
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